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Abstract
We consider the problem of integrating Reiter's default logic into ter-
minological representation systems. It turns out that such an integra-
tion is less straightforward than we expected, considering the fact that
the terminological language is a decidable sublanguage of rst-order
logic. Semantically, one has the unpleasant eect that the conse-
quences of a terminological default theory may be rather unintuitive,
and may even vary with the syntactic structure of equivalent concept
expressions. This is due to the unsatisfactory treatment of open de-
faults via Skolemization in Reiter's semantics. On the algorithmic
side, we show that this treatment may lead to an undecidable default
consequence relation, even though our base language is decidable, and
we have only nitely many (open) defaults. Because of these problems,
we then consider a restricted semantics for open defaults in our termi-
nological default theories: default rules are only applied to individuals
that are explicitly present in the knowledge base. In this semantics it
is possible to compute all extensions of a nite terminological default
theory, which means that this type of default reasoning is decidable.
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1 Introduction
Terminological representation systems are used to represent the taxonomic
and conceptual knowledge of a problem domain in a structured and well-
formed way. To describe this kind of knowledge, one starts with atomic
concepts (unary predicates) and roles (binary predicates), and denes more
complex concepts using the operations provided by the concept language of
the particular formalism. In addition to this concept description formalism,
most of these systems also have an assertional component. One can for
example state that an individual is an instance of a concept, or that two
individuals are connected by a role.
In terminological representation formalisms, the concept descriptions are
interpreted as universal statements, which means, unlike frame languages,
they do not allow for exceptions. As a consequence, the system can use
descriptions to automatically insert concepts at the proper place in the tax-
onomy (classication), and it can use the facts stated about individuals to
deduce to which concepts they must belong (realization). For example, one
could dene the concept Mammal as an Animal that feeds its young with
Milk, where feeds-young-with is used as a role. If the concept Platypus
1
is dened as an Animal that lives-in the Water, feeds its young with Milk,
and reproduces with Eggs, then the system will recognize that Platypus is a
subconcept of Mammal.
However, commonsense reasoning is often based on assumptions that may
ultimately be shown to be false. In our example, one might want to assume
by default that Mammals reproduce Viviparously. Only if it is known that a
specic mammal reproduces with eggs, should this assumption be cancelled.
If one wants to use terminological systems for this kind of commonsense rea-
soning, one needs a formalism that can handle such default assumptions, but
does not destroy the denitional character of concept descriptions|because
otherwise the advantage of automatic concept classication, etc., would be
lost (see [5]). Besides the general arguments for the importance of reason-
ing with defaults, which can be found in the nonmonotonic reasoning lit-
erature, the need for embedding defaults into terminological representation
formalisms is also substantiated by the fact that this is an important item on
the wish list of users of terminological representation systems (see e.g. [22]).
Several existing terminological systems, such as back [20], classic [6],
k-rep [16], loom [19], or sb-one [14], have been or will be extended to
provide the user with some kind of default reasoning facilities. However, as
the designers of these systems themselves point out, these approaches usually
1
We are taking this as our exceptional animal, in view of the fact that last IJCAI was
in Australia, and not in the Antarctic.
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have an ad hoc character, and are not equipped with a formal semantics. For
example, defaults in the fame system, which is built using k-rep, \will not
be complete (or even consistent)" ([16], p.11) unless the user is very careful
when using them. In classic, \a limited form of defaults can be represented
with the aid of rules and test functions." However, the user is warned to
\use this trick with extreme caution" ([6], p.45,46).
Our arguments for the importance of default extensions for terminological
representation languages so far were given from the viewpoint of the termi-
nological systems community. However, these investigations may also be of
interest for research in nonmonotonic reasoning itself. Most nonmonotonic
reasoning formalisms (e.g. Reiter's default logic [25], Circumscription [17])
use full rst-order predicate logic as their base language. In this general form,
the formalisms are usually highly undecidable (see e.g. [25] Theorem 4.9). For
this reason, work on decision procedures for decidable subcases was mostly
restricted to propositional logic (see e.g. [13]), thus leaving the wide gap be-
tween propositional logic and full rst-order logic almost unexplored. Since
most terminological representation languages can be viewed as decidable sub-
classes of rst-order logic|but are nevertheless much more expressive than
propositional logic|they can serve as interesting test cases for nonmonotonic
reasoning formalisms. We shall see that this not only applies for algorithmic,
but also for semantic considerations.
We shall here consider the problem of integrating Reiter's default log-
ic into a terminological representation formalism. This treatment of de-
faults in terminological systems has already been proposed by Brachman
and Schmolze [7], but to the best of our knowledge, this proposal was never
followed up. Reiter's default rule approach seems to t well into the philos-
ophy of terminological systems because most of them already provide their
users with a form of \monotonic" rules. These rules can be considered as
special default rules where the justications|which make the behaviour of
default rules nonmonotonic|are absent.
At rst sight, one might think that, from a semantic point of view, the
proposed integration should be unproblematic. In fact, the terminological
representation language we shall consider (see Section 2) is a sublanguage
of rst-order logic, and Reiter's semantics has been formulated for full rst-
order logic. However, on closer inspection it turns out that one runs into
severe problems, due to the unsatisfactory treatment of open defaults by
Skolemization (see Section 3).
A similar problem arises when considering the integration from the al-
gorithmic point of view. In the abstract of their paper on how to compute
extensions for default logic, Junker and Konolige [12] write that their method
is applicable if the default theory \consists of a nite number of defaults and
premises and classical derivability for the base language is decidable." A
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related formulation can be found in the abstract of Schwind and Risch's pa-
per on the same topic [28]. Since our base language is decidable, and we
certainly do not want to have innitely many default rules, these methods
seem to apply in our case. However, a closer look at the papers reveals that
by \a nite number of defaults" it is meant \a nite number of closed de-
faults." But the default rules we want to consider are open defaults. In fact,
as already pointed out by Reiter ([25], p.115) \the genuinely interesting cases
involve open defaults." In Section 4 we shall show that, with our (decidable)
terminological language as base language, a nite set of premises and open
defaults may lead to an undecidable default consequence problem, if the open
defaults are treated as proposed by Reiter ([25], Section 7.1).
Because of the semantic as well as algorithmic problems posed by Reiter's
treatment of open defaults, we shall consider a restricted semantics for open
defaults in our integration: default rules are only applied to individuals that
are explicitly present in the assertional part (ABox) of the knowledge base.
Though one may thus lose some intuitive default inferences, this treatment of
default rules is akin to the treatment of the monotonic rules in terminological
systems such as classic.
With this restricted semantics, a nite set of open defaults stands for a set
of closed defaults that is nite as well. Thus the above-mentioned methods
of Schwind and Risch and of Junker and Konolige can be applied to compute
extensions (see Section 5). In order to make these methods more ecient,
one has to solve certain algorithmic problems for the terminological language.
For Junker and Konolige's methods one has to nd minimal proofs for asser-
tional facts|which can be seen as an abduction problem for ABoxes|and
for Schwind and Risch's method one must nd maximal consistent sets of
assertional facts. In Section 6 we shall point out how the tableaux-based
methods for assertional reasoning developed in our group ([10, 2]) can be
modied to solve these problems.
2 The Representation Formalisms
First we shall briey review the terminological language ALCF [11] and
Reiter's default logic. Then terminological default logic is dened as the
specialization of default logic to ALCF . Finally an example will illustrate
why Reiter uses Skolemization in his semantics for open default theories.
2.1 The terminological language ALCF
Terminological knowledge representation formalisms can be used to dene the
relevant concepts of a problem domain (terminological knowledge), and to
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describe objects of this domain with respect to their relation to concepts and
their interrelation with each other (assertional knowledge). Depending on
which constructs are allowed for building concept descriptions we get dierent
terminological languages. In the present paper we restrict our attention to
the language ALCF .
Denition 2.1 The terminological part of the language ALCF consists of
the following concept description formalism. The concept terms of this for-
malism are built from concept, role and attribute names using the con-
structors conjunction (C uD), disjunction (C tD), negation (:C), exists-
restriction (9R:C), value-restriction (8R:C), and agreement (u
:
= v). Here
C;D stand for concept terms, R for a role or attribute name, and u; v for
nite sequences of attribute names.
The assertional part of our language allows us to assert facts concerning par-
ticular objects. These objects are referred to by individual names, and we can
state that an object belongs to a concept (written C(a)), or that two objects
are related by a role or attribute (written R(a; b)). Here a; b stand for indi-
vidual names, C for a concept term, and R for a role or attribute name. A
nite set of such facts is called an ABox.
The semantics of an ABox can either be given directly by dening inter-
pretations and models, or by a translation into rst-order logic. In order to
make the fact explicit that we are dealing with a sublanguage of rst-order
logic, we choose the second option.
Concept names are considered as symbols for unary predicates, and role
and attribute names as symbols for binary predicates. Consequently, concept
names A are translated into (atomic) formulae A(x) with one free variable,
and role and attribute names R into (atomic) formulae R(x; y) with two free
variables. The attributes have to be interpreted as partial functions, which
can be expressed by a formula 8x; y; z: (f(x; y) ^ f(x; z) ! y = z) for each
attribute name f .
Concept terms are also translated into formulae with one free variable.
The semantics of conjunction, disjunction, and negation are dened in the
obvious way, i.e., (C u D)(x) := C(x) ^ D(x), (C tD)(x) := C(x) _ D(x),
and (:C)(x) := :C(x). For value-restrictions we dene (8R:C)(x) :=
8y: (R(x; y) ! C(y)), and the semantics of exists-restrictions is given by
(9R:C)(x) := 9y: (R(x; y) ^ C(y)). Let u = f
1
   f
m
, and v = g
1
   g
n
be
sequences of attributes. The agreement construct built from these sequences
is translated into the formula (u
:
= v)(x) := 9y
1
; : : : ; y
m
; z
1
; : : : z
n
: (f
1
(x; y
1
)^
: : : f
m
(y
m 1
; y
m
) ^ g
1
(x; z
1
) ^ : : : g
n
(z
n 1
; z
n
) ^ y
m
= z
n
):
The individual names of the Abox are considered as constant symbols.
In terminological systems one usually has a unique name assumption, which
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can be expressed by the formulae a 6= b for all distinct individual names
a; b. The formula corresponding to the assertional fact C(a) (resp. R(a; b))
is obtained by replacing the free variable(s) in the formula corresponding to
C (resp. R) by a (resp. a; b). To sum up, an ABox is translated into a set
of rst order formulae consisting of the translations of the ABox facts, the
formulae expressing unique name assumption, and the formulae expressing
that attributes are partial functions.
The basic inference service for ABoxes is called instantiation. It answers
the question of whether (the translation of) a given ABox fact C(a) is a
(logical) consequence of (the translation of) a given ABox A. If the answer
is yes we say that a is an instance of C with respect to A (A j= C(a)). Algo-
rithms which solve this inference problem have, for example, been described
in [10, 2].
2.2 Reiter's default logic
Reiter [25] deals with the problem of how to formalize nonmonotonic rea-
soning by introducing nonstandard, nonmonotonic inference rules, which he
calls default rules. A default rule is any expression of the form
 : 
1
; : : : ; 
n

;
where , 
1
, : : : , 
n
,  are rst-order formulae. Here  is called the prerequi-
site of the rule, 
1
; : : : ; 
n
are its justications, and  is its consequent. For a
set of default rules D, we denote the sets of formulae occurring as prerequi-
sites, justications, and consequents in D by Pre(D), Jus(D), and Con(D),
respectively.
A default rule is closed i , 
1
; : : : ; 
n
,  do not contain free variables. A
default theory is a pair (W;D) whereW is a set of closed rst-order formulae
(the world description) and D is a set of default rules. A default theory is
closed i all its default rules are closed.
Intuitively, a closed default rule can be applied, i.e., its consequent is
added to the current set of beliefs, if its prerequisite is already believed
and all its justications are consistent with the set of beliefs. Formally,
the consequences of a closed default theory are dened with reference to
the notion of an extension, which is a set of deductively closed rst-order
formulae dened by a xed point construction (see [25], p.89). In general,
a default theory may have more than one extension, or even no extension.
Depending on whether one wants to employ skeptical or credulous reasoning,
a closed formula  is a consequence of a closed default theory i it is in all
extensions or if it is in at least one extension of the theory. In general, this
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consequence relation is not even recursively enumerable (see [25], Theorem
4.9).
Reiter also gives an alternative characterization of an extension, which we
shall use, in a slightly modied way, as the denition of extension. Here and
in the following, Th(?) stands for the deductive closure of a set of formulae
?.
Denition 2.2 Let E be a set of closed formulae, and (W;D) be a closed
default theory. We dene
E
0
:=W
and for all i  0
E
i+1
:= E
i
[ f j  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D;  2 Th(E
i
);
and :
1
; : : : ;:
n
62 Th(E)g:
Then Th(E) is an extension of (W;D) i
Th(E) =
1
[
i=0
Th(E
i
):
Note that the extension Th(E) to be constructed by this iteration process
occurs in the denition of each iteration step. Since we are only adding
consequents of defaults during the iteration, any extension Th(E) of (W;D)
is of the form Th(W [ Con(D
0
)) for a subset D
0
of D. Reiter shows ([25],
Theorem 2.5) that the set
b
D =
n
 : 
1
; : : : ; 
n

2 D j  2 Th(E) and :
1
; : : : ;:
n
62 Th(E)
o
:
always satises this property. For this reason it is called set of generating
defaults for the extension Th(E). Another easy consequence of Denition 2.2
is that (W;D) has an inconsistent extension i W is inconsistent.
Reiter denes extensions of arbitrary default theories (W;D), i.e., default
theories with open defaults, as follows. First, the formulae of W and the
consequents of the defaults are Skolemized (see [25], Section 7). Second, a
set D
0
of closed default rules is generated by taking all ground instances (over
the initial signature together with the newly introduced Skolem functions) of
the defaults of D. Now E is an extension of (W;D) i E is an extension of the
closed default theory (W
0
;D
0
), where W
0
is the Skolemized form of W. The
reason for Skolemizing before building ground instances will be explained by
an example in Subsection 2.4.
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2.3 Terminological default theories
A terminological default theory is a pair (A;D) whereA is an ABox and D is a
nite set of default rules whose prerequisites, justications, and consequents
are concept terms. Obviously, since ABoxes can be seen as sets of closed
formulae, and since concept terms can be seen as formulae with one free
variable,
2
terminological default theories are subsumed by Reiter's notion of
an open default theory.
However, as for ABox reasoning without defaults, we are not interested in
arbitrary formulae as consequences of a terminological default theory (A;D),
but only in assertional facts of the form C(a), where a is an individual name
occurring in the original ABox A.
2.4 Why is Skolemization necessary ?
The following example shows that intuitively valid consequences would get
lost if one did not Skolemize. Suppose that our ABox consists of the fact
that Tom has some child who is a doctor, i.e., A = f(9child:doctor)(Tom)g.
By default we want to conclude that doctors usually are rich persons, and
usually have children who are doctors. Thus D consists of the default rules
doctor : rich-person
rich-person
and
doctor : 9child:doctor
9child:doctor
:
Skolemization of the world description A yields A
0
= fchild(Tom;Bill);
doctor(Bill)g, where Bill is a new Skolem constant, whereas Skolemization
of the consequent of the second default yields a unary Skolem function,
say child-of. It is easy to see that the corresponding closed default theo-
ry has exactly one extension, and that this extension contains the asser-
tional facts that Tom has a rich child and a grandchild who is a doctor,
i.e., (9child:rich-person)(Tom), and (9child:9child:doctor)(Tom). Intuitive-
ly, this comes from the fact that the closed defaults obtained by instantiating
our open defaults with the Skolemconstant Bill are applicable. Without these
ground instances, the above facts could not have been deduced by default. To
deduce by default that the grandchild of Tom is not only a doctor, but also
a rich one, the rst default has to be instantiated by the term child-of(Bill).
3 Problems Caused by Skolemization
In addition to the problem that Skolemization usually destroys the nice com-
positional character of our concept formulae, it is also problematic for more
2
The concept terms occurring in one rule are assumed to have identical free variables.
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severe reasons to be presented below. We shall give three examples which
demonstrate that Reiter's treatment of open defaults is problematic, from an
intuitive as well as a formal point of view.
Our rst example shows that the Skolemization of the world description
may lead to counterintuitive consequences of the default theory. Consider
the following concept term which can be used to express that an adult man
is married to a woman or is a bachelor
(9spouse:Woman) t Bachelor:
We assume that our ABox asserts that the individual Tom belongs to this
concept term, and that he is married to the woman Mary. In addition, we
take the following default (without prerequisite)
: :Woman
:Woman
;
which corresponds to a still-prevailing male chauvinism in linguistic usage.
In order to know with what individuals this default has to be instantiated,
we have to Skolemize our ABox facts. Translated into traditional rst-order
syntax, these facts yield the world description
f(9y: spouse(Tom; y) ^Woman(y)) _ Bachelor(Tom);
spouse(Tom;Mary);
Woman(Mary)g:
The Skolemized version of the rst formula is
() (spouse(Tom;Gordy) ^Woman(Gordy)) _ Bachelor(Tom);
where Gordy is introduced as a new Skolem constant. Because of the dis-
junction in this formula, our Skolemized world description does not im-
ply Woman(Gordy). Thus the chauvinistic default can re, and we get
:Woman(Gordy). Together with the formula () this yields Bachelor(Tom)
as a consequence of our default theory, which is rather surprising since our
ABox actually contains a female spouse of Tom.
As already pointed out by Poole, the reason for this strange behaviour
comes from that fact that \we have lost the context of what the Skolem
constants represent" ([23], p.907), in our case the context that Gordy was
originally introduced to stand for a female spouse of Tom. Poole proposes to
keep track of this context by using Hilbert's -symbol.
Although Poole's approach may avoid the problem in the above example,
it is of no avail in our next examples. These examples demonstrates that,
due to the problems caused by Skolemization, the consequences of a default
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theory depend on the syntactic form of the world description, i.e., for identical
sets of open defaults, logically equivalent world descriptions may lead to
dierent results.
In our second example we consider concept terms C
1
:= 9R:(A uB) and
C
2
:= 9R:A where R is a role name and A;B are concept names. Obviously,
if we assert that an individual a is in the rst term this implies that it is
in the second one as well. For this reason, the ABoxes A
1
:= fC
1
(a)g and
A
2
:= fC
1
(a); C
2
(a)g are logically equivalent. When Skolemizing the rst
ABox, we get a single new Skolem constant b which is R-related to a and lies
in A u B, whereas when Skolemizing the second ABox we get two Skolem
constants c and d, both R-related to a, but where c lies in AuB and d lies in
A. Now consider the (open) default A : :B=:B: For the Skolemized version
ofA
1
, this default is instantiated with a; b, whereas for the Skolemized version
of A
2
it is instantiated with a; c; d. Obviously, the default rule cannot re for
b and c, because their being in AuB is inconsistent with its justication. On
the other hand, this default rule can be applied to d, because being in A is
consistent with being in :B. For this reason, d is put into :B, which shows
that the Skolemized version of A
2
has (9R::B)(a) as a default consequence,
whereas this fact cannot be deduced by default from the Skolemized version of
A
1
. Technically, the reason for this behaviour is due to the fact that, before
the application of the default, the individuals c and d might be identical
(which is the reason why the two ABoxes are logically equivalent) whereas
this is no longer possible after the default has been applied.
The third example is similar to the second. It is quite obvious that the
concept terms 9R:(A t B) and (9R:A) t (9R:B) are equivalent. Let A
1
be an ABox where a is asserted to be in the rst concept term, and A
2
one
where a is asserted to be in the second concept term. When using a standard
Skolemization method, the rst ABox yields one new Skolem constant, and
the second ABox yields two. Now it is easy to see that the corresponding
instantiations of the default ruleA tB : C=C can only re for the Skolemized
version of the rst ABox. Consequently, we have a in 9R:C as a default
consequence of the rst ABox, but not of the second one, even though these
two ABoxes are equivalent.
Lifschitz [15] proposes a treatment of open defaults which avoids Skolem-
ization by working with classes of models instead of sets of formulae in the
denition of default extensions. Obviously, working with models means that
logically equivalent formulae must yield the same results. This shows that
Lifschitz's approach can overcome the problem pointed out in the previous
two examples, even though it was not motivated by the problems connected
with Skolemization (see footnote 1 in [15]: \Skolemization ... is irrelevant
for this discussion.") Lifschitz's motivation was to make it possible to derive
by default universally quantied formulae of the form 8x: C(x), which is not
11
possible with Reiter's approach, but which is not necessary in our context
(because the terminological inference service is only meant to derive new
ABox facts, i.e., formulae of the form C(a)). From our point of view, the
main problem of Lifschitz's approach is that working with models means that
it becomes even harder to get algorithms for computing extensions. Another
problem of his approach is that one gets rather unexpected consequences,
due to the fact that models of dierent cardinality are treated separately.
For example, assume that one has formulae  3 and  2 expressing that a
model has at least 3 and at most 2 elements, respectively, which would, for
example, be available in concept languages allowing for number-restrictions
and a universal role, i.e., a role U that satises 8x; y: U(x; y). The default
theory consisting of an empty world description and the closed defaults
 2 :
C(a)
and
 3 :
C(a)
has C(a) as consequence, which means that this approach makes a case anal-
ysis with respect to the cardinality of models. But for other cases, Lifschitz's
approach still does not make case analysis. For example, the theory consist-
ing of an empty world description and the closed defaults
A(a) :
C(a)
and
:A(a) :
C(a)
does not have C(a) as a consequence.
4 An Undecidability Result
In addition to the semantic problems caused by Skolemization, we shall now
show that, for our base language ALCF , this treatment of open defaults also
leads to an undecidable default consequence relation, even though ALCF is
decidable. This is achieved by reducing the word problem for semigroups
[24] to the consequence problem of a default theory.
Let  be a nite alphabet, and let R = f(u
1
; v
1
); : : : , (u
n
; v
n
)g be a nite
set of relations presenting a semigroup over . In the following we shall treat
the elements of  as attribute names. The semigroup presentation is used
to dene a nite set of open defaults as follows. For any f 2  and for any
relation (u
i
; v
i
) 2 R we have defaults
A :
8f:A
and
A :
u
i
:
= v
i
:
If we want to decide whether the words u; v are equivalent with respect to
R, we take the ABox A
u;v
:= fA(a); (u
:
= u)(a); (v
:
= v)(a)g as our world
description.
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Proposition 4.1 With respect to the set of defaults induced by  and R,
the ABox fact (u
:
= v)(a) is a default consequence of A
u;v
i u and v are
equivalent with respect to R.
Intuitively, the world description puts a into A, and asserts sequences
of attributes u, v starting from a. The implicit individuals lying on these
sequences are made explicit by Skolemization. The rst type of defaults puts
all individuals reachable from a by a sequence of attributes into A, and the
second type identies individuals which can be reached by the respective
sequences u
i
and v
i
from an individual in A, thus simulating application of
relations from R. (It should be noted that the consequents of this second
type of defaults are also responsible for the introduction of new implicit
individuals.)
Since a formal proof of the proposition is straightforward but rather te-
dious, we shall just illustrate it by an example. Consider the semigroup
presentation R = f(fg; gf)g over the alphabet  = ff; gg. This presenta-
tion is transformed into the default rules
A :
8f:A
;
A :
8g:A
; and
A :
fg
:
= gf
:
Obviously, the words fgg and ggf are equivalent with respect to R. If we
want to obtain this equivalence as a consequence of applying the above default
rules, we take the Abox A
fgg;ggf
= fA(a); (fgg
:
= fgg)(a); (ggf
:
= ggf)(a)g
as our world description.
Translated into rst-order logic and then Skolemized, this ABox yields
the world description
f A(a);
f(a; b
1
) ^ g(b
1
; b
2
) ^ g(b
2
; b
3
);
g(a; c
1
) ^ g(c
1
; c
2
) ^ f(c
2
; c
3
);
8x; y; z: (f(x; y) ^ f(x; z)! y = z);
8x; y; z: (g(x; y) ^ g(x; z)! y = z) g;
where the last two formulae are expressing that f; g are interpreted as partial
functions, and b
1
; : : : ; c
3
are Skolem constants. Note that these formulae
have already been used to simplify the rest of the ABox, and that redundant
equalities have been removed. We want to show that b
3
= c
3
is a consequence
of the default theory.
The translated and Skolemized form of the consequent fg
:
= gf of the
third default is f(x; h
1
(x)) ^ g(h
1
(x); h
2
(x)) ^ g(x; k
1
(x)) ^ f(k
1
(x); k
2
(x)) ^
h
2
(x) = k
2
(x), where h
1
; h
2
; k
1
; k
2
are unary Skolem functions.
Since A(a) is in our world description, the third default, instantiated
by a, is applicable, and yields f(a; h
1
(a)) ^ g(h
1
(a); h
2
(a)) ^ g(a; k
1
(a)) ^
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f(k
1
(a); k
2
(a)) ^ h
2
(a) = k
2
(a). The formulae which express that f; g are
partial functions yield h
1
(a) = b
1
, h
2
(a) = b
2
, and k
1
(a) = c
1
.
Applying the second default, instantiated by a, we get 8y: (g(a; y) !
A(y)), which in turn yields A(c
1
). Now we can apply the third default,
instantiated by c
1
, which yields f(c
1
; h
1
(c
1
))^g(h
1
(c
1
); h
2
(c
1
))^g(c
1
; k
1
(c
1
))^
f(k
1
(c
1
); k
2
(c
1
)) ^ h
2
(c
1
) = k
2
(c
1
). Because of the formulae expressing that
f; g are partial functions we get c
2
= k
1
(c
1
); c
3
= k
2
(c
1
), and, using the
additional fact k
1
(a) = c
1
, also k
2
(a) = h
1
(c
1
).
To sum up we have b
2
= h
2
(a) = k
2
(a) = h
1
(c
1
), c
3
= k
2
(c
1
) = h
2
(c
1
),
and g(b
2
; b
3
) as well as g(h
1
(c
1
); h
2
(c
1
)). This yields b
3
= h
2
(c
1
) = c
3
, which
is what we wanted to show.
Since the word problem for semigroups is in general undecidable, the
proposition shows that our terminological default theories in general have an
undecidable consequence problem.
Corollary 4.2 The consequence problem for an open default theory is in
general undecidable, even if one has a nite set of defaults and the base
language is decidable.
It should be noted that the default rules used in the reduction are mono-
tonic (i.e., they do not have justications). Consequently, the default theory
has exactly one extension, which shows that the undecidability result is inde-
pendent of whether one wants to employ skeptical or credulous reasoning. In
addition, this shows that the consequences of rule applications in the classic
system would become undecidable, if classic applied rules not only to indi-
viduals explicitly present in the ABox, but also to implicit individuals. This
result for classic rules has already been mentioned by Nebel and Smolka
[21], but without proof. In the next section we shall see that the restriction
to explicit individuals leads to a decidable consequence relation even if one
allows nonmonotonic default rules instead of classic's monotonic rules.
5 Computing Extensions
Because of the problems caused by Skolemization in Reiter's treatment of
open defaults, we now propose a restricted semantics for open default the-
ories: default rules are only applied to individuals that are explicitly men-
tioned in the ABox.
Denition 5.1 In the restricted semantics for terminological default theo-
ries, an open default of a terminological default theory (A;D) is interpreted
as representing the closed defaults obtained by instantiating the free variable
by all individual names occurring in A.
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Because the ABox A and the set of open defaults D are assumed to be
nite, we end up with a nite set of closed defaults. Since our terminological
language is decidable, the methods of Junker and Konolige, or of Schwind and
Risch can be applied to compute all extensions (according to our restricted
semantics).
In principle, both methods depend on the fact that any extension of a
closed default theory (A;D) is of the form Th(A [ Con(
b
D)) for a subset
b
D
of D. If D is nite, there are only nitely many such subsets, and the only
problem is to decide which of these generate an extension. In fact, if the
base language is decidable, one could even use for this purpose the iteration
process described in the denition of an extension. This is so because de-
cidability of the base language makes each iteration step eective, and the
iteration process terminates because there are only nitely many consequents
to be added. However, with this method one has to consider all the (expo-
nentially many) subsets of D. The two methods which we shall describe
below try to avoid considering all subsets, thus making the search for (the
sets of generating defaults of) all extensions more ecient.
5.1 Junker and Konolige's method
Junker and Konolige [12] translate a closed default theory (A;D) into a Truth
Maintenance Network (TMN) a la Doyle [8]. The nodes of the TMN are the
consequents C
D
, and the prerequisites and negated justications L
D
of the
defaults. A default  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= of D is translated into a nonmonotonic
justication hin(); out(:
1
; : : : ;:
n
) ! i of the TMN. In order to sup-
ply the truth maintenance system with enough information about rst-order
derivability in the base language, each prerequisite and negated justication
of a default gives rise to several monotonic justications of the TMN. These
justications are of the form hin(Q)! qi where q 2 L
D
, and Q is a minimal
subset of C
D
such that A [Q entails q|i.e., A [ Q j= q but A [ Q
0
6j= q for
every proper subset Q
0
of Q.
Junker and Konolige show that there is a 1{1-correspondence between
admissible labellings of the TMN thus obtained and extensions of the de-
fault theory, and they describe an algorithm which computes all admissible
labellings of a TMN. Given such an admissible labelling, the set of gener-
ating defaults of the corresponding extension consists of the defaults whose
consequents are labelled \in."
In order to make the translation of terminological default theories into
TMNs eective, one has to show how to compute the above mentionedmono-
tonic justications of the TMN. First note that the elements of L
D
[ C
D
are
admissible assertional facts. This is obvious for the prerequisites and the
consequents of our instantiated defaults, and for the negated justications it
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follows from the fact that the concept language has negation as an operator.
For this reason, A [ Q for a subset Q of C
D
is an admissible ABox of our
language, and the entailment problem A [ Q j= q for q 2 L
D
is an ordinary
instantiation problem. As mentioned in Section 2, the instantiation problem
is decidable for our language. A brute force algorithm could just compute
all subsets Q of C
D
such that A [ Q entails q 2 L
D
, and then, for each q,
eliminate the ones which are not minimal. Of course, this simple algorithm
is very inecient, and thus not appropriate for actual implementations.
Because A[Q entails an assertional fact C(a) i A[Q[ f:C(a)g is in-
consistent, we need a solution of the following problem: Let A, B be ABoxes.
Find all minimal subsets Q of B such that A [ Q is inconsistent. Since a
similar algorithmic problem has to be solved for the method obtained from
Schwind and Risch's characterization of an extension, we defer the descrip-
tion of a more ecient solution of this problem to a separate section.
A characteristic feature of Junker and Konolige's method is that|after
the computation of the minimal sets Q|it is completely abstracted from
derivability in the base language. This may be advantageous from a con-
ceptual point of view, but it can be problematic from the algorithmic point
of view. In fact, one has to compute the corresponding minimal sets for all
elements q in L
D
, even though this information may not contribute to the
computation of an extension.
5.2 A method based on a theorem by Schwind and
Risch
Schwind and Risch [28] give a theorem which characterizes those subsets
b
D
of D which are sets of generating defaults of an extension of a closed default
theory (W;D). They use this characterization for computing extensions of
propositional default theories. In this subsection, we shall show how to apply
the theorem to computing extensions of terminological default theories.
Before we can formulate the theorem we need one more piece of notation.
Denition 5.2 Let W be a set of closed formulae, and D be a set of closed
defaults. We dene D
0
= ; and, for i  0,
D
i+1
= D
i
[ fd =
 : 
1
; : : : ; 
n

j d 2 D and W [ Con(D
i
) j= g:
Then D is called grounded in W i D =
S
1
i=0
D
i
.
This denition of groundedness diers from the one given in [28], but
it is easy to see that both formulations are equivalent. The advantage of
our formulation is that it can directly be used as a procedure for deciding
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groundedness, if D is nite and the entailment problem in the base language
is decidable. If D is not grounded in W, then
S
1
i=0
D
i
is the largest subset of
D that is grounded in W.
The iteration process described above corresponds to the iteration in the
denition of extensions, with the main dierence that it disregards the justi-
cations. The second condition given in the following theorem makes up for
this neglect.
Theorem 5.3 (Schwind and Risch) Let (W;D) be a closed default theo-
ry. A subset
b
D of D is a set of generating defaults of an extension of (W;D)
i the following two conditions hold:
1.
b
D is grounded in W.
2. For all d 2 D with d =  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= we have d 2
b
D i W [
Con(
b
D) j=  and for all i; 1  i  n, W [ Con(
b
D) 6j= :
i
.
IfD is nite, and the entailmentproblem in the base language is decidable,
this theorem provides us with an eective test of whether a subset
b
D of D is
a set of generating defaults of an extension of (W;D). We shall now describe
a method based on this theorem which allows us to compute (the sets of
generating defaults of) all extensions without having to consider all subsets
of D.
IfW is inconsistent then there is only one extension, namely the set of all
formulae. In the following, we shall without loss of generality assume that
W is consistent. Now, let D
0
be the largest subset of D that is grounded in
W, and let D
1
; : : : ;D
m
be all maximal subsets of D
0
such that W [Con(D
i
)
is consistent. Since W is assumed to be consistent, extensions are consistent
as well, which means that a generating set of defaults of an extension is a
subset of one of the D
i
. The idea underlying our method is to start with
these maximal sets D
i
, and successively eliminate defaults violating the rst
condition of the theorem, or the \only if" part of the second condition. If
no more defaults can be eliminated, the \if" part of the second condition is
tested.
Figure 1 describes the procedure for computing all extensions of a closed
default theory. To show soundness and completeness of the procedure (The-
orem 5.7) we need three lemmas.
Lemma 5.4 Let (W;D) be a closed default theory and let D
0
 D be such
that W[Con(D
0
) is consistent. Suppose the call Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
)
returns the list L of sets of defaults. If D
0
2 L then D
0
is a set of generating
defaults for an extension of (W;D).
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Compute-All-Extensions(W;D)
begin
(1) if W is inconsistent
(2) then print \Inconsistent world description"
(3) else for all maximal subsets D
0
of D
0
such that
W [ Con(D
0
) is consistent
(4) do Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
);
end
Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
)
begin
(1) let D
0
be the largest subset of D
0
that is grounded in W;
(2) if W [ Con(D
0
) j= :
i
for some justication 
i
2 Jus(D
0
)
(3) then let d =  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= be the corresponding default;
(4) Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
n fdg);
(5) for all maximal subsets D
00
of D
0
such that
d 2 D
00
and W [ Con(D
00
) 6j= :
i
(6) do Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
00
);
(7) else if for each  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D n D
0
either W [ Con(D
0
) 6j= 
(8) or W [ Con(D
0
) j= :
i
for some i
(9) then add D
0
to the list of sets of generating defaults;
end
Figure 1: Procedure for computing the sets of generating defaults of all
extensions of the closed default theory (W;D). Proviso: D is nite and
entailment in the base language is decidable.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that a set D
0
of defaults con-
tained in L satises Conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 5.3.
Suppose that D
0
is contained in L. It is easy to see that D
0
is a subset of
D
0
that is grounded in W (because of line (1)), which shows that Condition
1 of Theorem 5.3 holds for D
0
.
To show that D
0
satises the second condition of Theorem 5.3, rst as-
sume that d =  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D
0
. Recall that D
0
is grounded in W,
which implies that W [ Con(D
0
) j= . Furthermore, observe that, for all i,
1  i  n, W [ Con(D
0
) 6j= :
i
(because the condition in line (2) does not
hold for D
0
). Both facts together show that the \only if" part of Condition
2 holds.
Now assume that d =  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D n D
0
. Then either W [
Con(D
0
) 6j=  or W [ Con(D
0
) j= :
i
for some i (because the condition in
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lines (7) and (8) holds for D
0
). This shows that the \if" part of Condition 2
is also satised.
Lemma 5.5 Let D
0
be a set of generating defaults for an extension of a
closed default theory (W;D), and let D
0
be a subset of D such that D
0
 D
0
and W [ Con(D
0
) is consistent. If Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
) recursively
calls Remove-Defaults then there is a call with arguments W;D;D
00
where
D
0
 D
00
 D
0
.
Proof. Let D
0
 D
0
be sets of defaults satisfying the assumptions of the
lemma. Suppose Remove-Defaults is called with arguments W;D;D
0
. Let
D
0
0
be the largest subset of D
0
that is grounded inW. Then D
0
 D
0
0
because
every set of generating defaults for an extension of (W;D) is grounded inW.
If the condition in line (2) does not hold for D
0
0
, Remove-Defaults is
obviously not called recursively, and nothing has to be shown. Thus assume
that the condition in line (2) holds for D
0
0
. This means that there is a
default d =  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D
0
0
such that W [ Con(D
0
0
) j= :
i
for some i,
1  i  n.
If d 62 D
0
we have D
0
 D
0
0
n fdg  D
0
0
, and the call of Remove-Defaults
with arguments W;D;D
0
0
n fdg) (cf. line (4)) satises the required property.
Now assume that d 2 D
0
. Since D
0
is a set of generating defaults for an
extension we know that W [ Con(D
0
) 6j= :
i
. Thus there is a maximal
subset D
00
of D
0
0
with W [Con(D
00
) 6j= :
i
that contains D
0
, and this means
that the call Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
00
) has the required property (cf. line
(5) and (6)).
Lemma 5.6 Let D
0
be a set of generating defaults for an extension of a
closed default theory (W;D), and let D
0
be a subset of D such that D
0
 D
0
and W [ Con(D
0
) is consistent. Suppose Remove-Defaults is called with
arguments W;D;D
0
. Then
 there is a recursive call of Remove-Defaults, or
 D
0
is added to the list of sets of generating defaults.
Proof. Let D
0
 D
0
be sets of defaults satisfying the assumptions of the
lemma. Suppose the call Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
) does not recursively
call Remove-Defaults. This means that the condition in line (2) does not
hold for D
0
0
, where D
0
0
is the largest subset of D
0
that is grounded in W. We
show that D
0
0
= D
0
.
Since D
0
is grounded in W, we get D
0
 D
0
0
, and thus we only have to
show D
0
0
 D
0
. Assume to the contrary that D
0
0
n D
0
6= ;. First we show
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that W [ Con(D
0
) j=  for some default  : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
= 2 D
0
0
n D
0
. To see
this, recall that D
0
0
is grounded in W. This means that there is a sequence
d
0
1
; d
0
2
; : : : of default in D
0
0
such that W [ Con(fd
0
1
; : : : ; d
0
k 1
g) j= 
0
k
where

0
k
is the prerequisite of the k-th default. Let l be the smallest number such
that d
0
l
2 D
0
0
n D
0
. Thus d
0
j
2 D
0
for all j, 1  j < l, which shows that
W [ Con(D
0
) j= 
0
l
.
Second, we have W [ Con(D
0
0
) 6j= :
i
for all justications 
i
2 Jus(D
0
0
)
because the condition in line (2) does not hold for D
0
0
. Since D
0
 D
0
0
we
especially know that W [ Con(D
0
) 6j= :
i
for all justications 
i
2 Jus(D
0
).
Thus, we have shown that there is some default d 2 D
0
0
n D
0
, d =
 : 
1
; : : : ; 
n
=, such that W [ Con(D
0
) j=  and W [ Con(D
0
) 6j= :
i
for all i, 1  i  n. Because of Theorem 5.3 this is a contradiction with our
assumption that D
0
is a set of generating defaults. Therefore the assumption
D
0
0
n D
0
6= ; is falsied, and we can conclude that D
0
0
= D
0
.
Since D
0
is a set of generating defaults, the condition in lines (7), (8)
holds for D
0
(cf. Condition 2 of Theorem 5.3). Thus D
0
is added to the list
of sets of generating defaults.
Now we are ready to prove soundness and completeness of our algorithm.
First we observe that every set of defaults computed by the algorithm is in
fact a set of generating defaults for an extension of a closed default theory
(W;D) (cf. Lemma 5.4).
Now assume that D
0
is a set of generating defaults for an extension of
(W;D). Recall that W [ Con(D
0
) is consistent. Thus there is a maximal
subset D
0
of D such thatW[Con(D
0
) is consistent and D
0
contains D
0
. This
shows that Compute-All-Extensions(W;D) generates a call Remove-Defaults
with argumentsW;D;D
0
(cf. lines (3) and (4) in the function Compute-All-
Extensions) for some subset D
0
of D with D
0
 D
0
.
If the call Remove-Defaults(W;D;D
0
) returns the list L of sets of defaults
then D
0
is contained in L. This result is an immediate consequence of the
previous two lemmas. In fact, Lemma 5.5 shows that there is a sequence of
calls of Remove-Defaults such that W, D, C
i
are the arguments of the i-th
call where C
1
= D
0
, C
i+1
 C
i
, and D
0
 C
i
for all i. Since D is assumed to
be nite and the C
i
's are decreasing, there is some m  i such that Remove-
Defaults(W;D; C
m
) does not generate a recursive call of Remove-Defaults.
In this case D
0
is added to the list L of sets of defaults (Lemma 5.6).
Theorem 5.7 The call of the procedure Compute-All-Extensions with input
(W;D) computes sets of generating defaults for all extensions of the closed
default theory (W;D).
The functions Compute-All-Extensions and Remove-Defaults use the fol-
lowing subprocedures which have not explicitly been described:
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 Decide whether W is consistent.
 Compute all maximal subsets D
0
of D such that W [ Con(D
0
) is con-
sistent.
 Compute the largest subset D
0
of D
0
that is grounded in W.
 Compute all maximal subsets D
00
of D
0
such thatW[Con(D
00
) 6j= :
i
.
The rst subprocedure is a direct application of the decision algorithm for
entailment in the base language. The third subprocedure is simply obtained
by implementing the denition of groundedness.
The other two procedures depend on an algorithm for the following prob-
lem, which will be considered in the next section: Let A;B be ABoxes.
Compute all maximal subsets Q of B such that A [Q is consistent.
In fact, the second subprocedure is a direct application of such an al-
gorithm. For the fourth subprocedure, note that W [ Con(D
00
) 6j= :
i
i
W [ Con(D
00
) [ f
i
g is consistent.
6 ComputingMinimal Inconsistent andMax-
imal Consistent ABoxes
This section is concerned with the following algorithmic problems: Given
two ABoxes A;B, nd all minimal (resp. maximal) subsets Q of B such that
A [Q is inconsistent (resp. consistent).
Since consistency of ABoxes in ALCF is decidable, there is the obvious
\brute-force" solution which tests consistency of A [ Q for all subsets Q
of B, and then takes the minimal inconsistent (maximal consistent) ones.
In the following we shall describe a more ecient method of nding these
minimal (maximal) sets. The method is an extension of the tableaux-based
consistency algorithms for ABoxes described in [1, 10]. The idea of employing
tableaux-based methods for such purposes was already used in [18, 28], but
these papers restricted themselves to propositional logic, which is a much
easier case.
In order to decide whether an ABox A is consistent, the tableaux-based
consistency algorithm tries to generate a nite model of A. In principle, it
starts with A, and adds new assertional facts with the help of certain rules
until the obtained ABox is \complete," i.e., one can apply no more rules.
Because of the presence of disjunction in our language, a given ABox must
sometimes be transformed into two dierent new ABoxes, with the intended
meaning that the original ABox is consistent i one of the new ABoxes is
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Let M be a nite set of ABoxes, and let A
0
be an element of
M. The following rules replace A
0
by an ABox A
1
or by two
ABoxes A
1
and A
2
.
The conjunction rule. Assume that (C uD)(a) is in A
0
, and that A
0
does not contain both assertions C(a) and D(a). The ABox A
1
is
obtained from A
0
by adding C(a) and D(a).
The disjunction rule. Assume that (C tD)(a) is in A
0
, and that A
0
contains neither C(a) nor D(a). The ABox A
1
is obtained from A
0
by adding C(a), and the ABox A
2
is obtained from A
0
by adding
D(a).
The exists-restriction rule. Assume that (9R:C)(a) is in A
0
, and
that A
0
does not contain assertions R(a; c) and C(c) for some indi-
vidual c. One generates a new individual name b, and obtains A
1
from A
0
by adding R(a; b) and C(b).
The value-restriction rule. Assume that (8R:C)(a) and R(a; b) are in
A
0
, and that A
0
does not contain the assertion C(b). The ABox
A
1
is obtained from A
0
by adding C(b).
Figure 2: Transformation rules of the consistency algorithm for ALC.
consistent. Formally, this means that one is working with sets of ABoxes
instead of a single ABox.
For ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves in this formal description
to the terminological language ALC where we do not have attributes and
agreements. Later on, we shall point out how the algorithm can be extended
to ALCF .
Figure 2 describes the transformation rules of the tableaux-based con-
sistency algorithm for ALC. Without loss of generality we assume that the
concept terms occurring in A
0
are in negation normal form, i.e., negation
occurs only directly in front of concept names. Negation normal forms can
be generated using the fact that the following pairs of concept terms are
equivalent: ::C and C, :(C uD) and :C t :D, :(C tD) and :C u :D,
:(9R:C) and 8R::C, as well as :(8R:C) and 9R::C.
The following facts make clear why the rules of Figure 2 provide us with a
decision procedure for consistency of ABoxes of ALC (see [10, 1] for a proof).
Proposition 6.1
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1. If A
1
is obtained from A
0
by application of the conjunction, exists-
restriction, or value-restriction rule then A
0
is consistent i A
1
is con-
sistent.
2. If A
1
;A
2
are obtained from A
0
by application of the disjunction rule
then A
0
is consistent i A
1
or A
2
is consistent.
3. A complete ABox, i.e., an ABox to which no more rules apply, is
consistent i it does not contain an obvious contradiction, i.e., facts
A(b);:A(b) for an individual name b and a concept name A.
4. The transformation process always terminates.
An obvious contradiction of the form A(b);:A(b) will also be called
\clash" in the following.
To check whether a given ABox A is consistent one thus starts with fAg,
and applies transformation rules (in arbitrary order) as long as possible.
Eventually, this yields a nite set M of complete ABoxes with the property
that A is consistent i one of the ABoxes in M is consistent. Since the
elements of M are complete their consistency can simply be decided by
looking for an obvious contradiction.
Now assume that A;B are ABoxes, and we want to nd all minimal (resp.
maximal) subsets Q of B such that A [ Q is inconsistent (resp. consistent).
We start with applying the tableaux-based consistency algorithm to A [
B. Let A
1
; : : : ;A
m
be the complete ABoxes obtained this way. If one of
these is not obviously contradictory, A [ B is consistent, and there are no
minimal inconsistent sets to compute (resp. B is the maximal consistent
set). Otherwise, we want to know which elements of B can be dispensed
with without destroying the property that all complete ABoxes contain an
obvious contradiction (resp. which elements of B have to be removed to get
at least one complete ABox without obvious contradiction).
For this reason, it is important to know which facts in B contribute to a
particular obvious contradiction. To this purpose we introduce a proposition-
al variable for each element of B, and label assertional facts with \monotonic"
boolean formulae built from these variables, i.e., propositional formulae built
from the variables by using conjunction and disjunction only. In the original
ABox A[B, the elements of A are labelled with \true," and the elements of
B are labelled with the corresponding propositional variable. If, during the
consistency test, n assertional facts with labels 
1
; : : : ; 
n
give rise to a new
fact, the new one is labelled by 
1
^ : : :^ 
n
. Since the same assertional fact
may arise in more than one way, we also get disjunctions in labels. Again,
we end up with complete ABoxes A
1
; : : : ;A
m
, but now all assertional facts
occurring in these ABoxes have labels.
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More formally, we shall now describe a labelled consistency algorithm for
ABoxes A[B consisting of \hard" facts A and of \refutable" facts B. With-
out loss of generality we assume that the concept terms occurring in A [ B
are in negation normal form. Initially, the elements of A[B are labelled with
monotonic boolean formulae as described above. We shall refer to the label
of an assertional fact  by ind(). Starting with the singleton set fA [ Bg,
the transformation rules of Figure 3 are applied as long as possible.
As for the unlabelled consistency algorithm, there cannot be an innite
chain of rule applications. This can, for example, be shown by a straight-
forward adaptation to the labelled case of the termination ordering used in
[1].
Thus the labelled consistency algorithm also terminates with a nite set
of complete ABoxes, i.e., labelled ABoxes to which no rules apply. The labels
occurring in these ABoxes can be used to describe which of the original facts
in B are responsible for the obvious contradictions.
Denition 6.2 (Clash formula) Let A
1
; : : : ;A
n
be the complete ABoxes
obtained by applying the labelled consistency algorithm to A[B. A particular
clash A(a);:A(a) 2 A
i
is expressed by the propositional formula ind(A(a))^
ind(:A(a)). Now let  
i;1
; : : : ;  
i;k
i
be the formulae expressing all the clashes
in A
i
. The clash formula associated with A[ B is
n
^
i=1
k
i
_
j=1
 
i;j
:
We have used conjunction when expressing a single clash because both
assertional facts are necessary for the contradiction. Now recall that we need
at least one clash in each of the complete ABoxes to have inconsistency.
This explains why disjunction is used to combine the formulae expressing
the clashes of one complete ABox, and why the formulae corresponding to
the dierent complete ABoxes are combined with the help of conjunction.
Proposition 6.3 Let  be the clash formula associated with A [ B, let
Q  B, and let ! be the valuation which replaces the propositional vari-
ables corresponding to elements of Q by \true" and the others by \false."
Then A [Q is inconsistent i  evaluates to \true" under !.
Before proving this proposition we point out how the clash formula can
be used to nd minimal (resp. maximal) subsets Q of B such that A [ Q
is inconsistent (resp. consistent). By Proposition 6.3, such minimal (resp.
maximal) sets directly correspond to minimal (resp. maximal) valuations
making the clash formula  \true" (resp. \false"). Here \minimal" and
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Let M be a nite set of labelled ABoxes, and let A
0
be an
element of M. The following rules replace A
0
by an ABox
A
1
or by two ABoxes A
1
and A
2
. These new ABoxes either
contain additional assertional facts, or the indices of existing
assertional facts are changed. In order to avoid having to
distinguish between these two cases in the formulation of the
rules, we introduce a new notation. An ABox is extended by
an assertional fact with index  means the following: If this
fact is already present with index  , we just change its index
to  _. Otherwise, it is added to the ABox and gets index .
The conjunction rule. Assume that (C uD)(a) is in A
0
, and that A
0
does not contain assertions C(a) and D(a) whose indices are both
implied by ind((CuD)(a)). The ABoxA
1
is obtained by extending
A
0
by C(a) with index ind((C u D)(a)) and by D(a) with index
ind((C uD)(a)).
The disjunction rule. Assume that (C tD)(a) is in A
0
, and that A
0
does not contain C(a) or D(a) whose index is implied by ind((C t
D)(a)). The ABox A
1
is obtained by extending A
0
by C(a) with
index ind((C tD)(a)), and the ABox A
2
is obtained by extending
A
0
by D(a) with index ind((C tD)(a)).
The exists-restriction rule. Assume that (9R:C)(a) is in A
0
, and
that A
0
does not contain assertions R(a; c) and C(c) whose in-
dices are both implied by ind((9R:C)(a)). One generates a new
individual name b, and obtains A
1
from A
0
by adding R(a; b) and
C(b), both with index ind((9R:C)(a)).
The value-restriction rule. Assume that (8R:C)(a) and R(a; b) are in
A
0
, and that A
0
does not contain an assertion C(b) whose index is
implied by ind((8R:C)(a))^ind(R(a; b)). The ABoxA
1
is obtained
by extending A
0
by C(b) with index ind((8R:C)(a))^ ind(R(a; b)).
Figure 3: Transformation rules of the labelled consistency algorithm forALC.
\maximal" for valuations is meant with respect to the partial ordering !
1

!
2
i !
1
(p
i
)  !
2
(p
i
) for all propositional variables p
i
, where we assume that
\false" is smaller than \true."
It is easy to see that the problem of nding maximal valuations making a
monotonic boolean formula \false" can be reduced to the problem of nding
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minimal valuations making a monotonic boolean formula \true." In fact, for
a given monotonic boolean formula  and a valuation !, let  
d
denote the
formula obtained from  by replacing conjunction by disjunction and vice
versa, and let !
d
denote the valuation obtained from ! by replacing \true"
by \false" and vice versa. Then ! is a maximal valuation making  \false"
i !
d
is a minimal valuation making  
d
\true."
It should be noted that the problem of nding minimal valuations that
make a monotonic boolean formula  \true" is NP-complete. In fact, if  
is in conjunctive normal form, this is just the well-known problem of nding
minimal hitting sets [26, 9]. On the other hand, if  is in disjunctive normal
form, the minimal valuations can be found in polynomial time. Howev-
er, transforming a given monotonic boolean formula into disjunctive normal
form may cause an exponential blow-up. To optimize the search for minimal
valuations one can use the method described in [27].
The rules of the labelled consistency algorithm as described have the un-
pleasant property that deciding whether or not a rule is applicable is an
NP-hard problem. In fact, the preconditions of the rules include an entail-
ment test for monotonic boolean formulae, which is NP-hard. However, one
can weaken the precondition by testing a necessary condition for entailment
(e.g. occurrence of the index in the top-level disjunction) without destroying
termination and the property stated in Proposition 6.3. In this case, the
rules will in general produce longer formulae occurring as indices, but the
test whether a rule applies becomes tractable.
Proof of Proposition 6.3
First we shall explain the connection between application of rules of the
labelled consistency algorithm, starting with A [ B, on the one hand, and
application of rules of the unlabelled algorithm, starting with A [ Q for
Q  B, on the other hand.
Denition 6.4 Let A
0
be a labelled ABox, and let ! be a valuation. The
!-projection of A
0
(for short, !(A
0
)) is obtained from A
0
by removing all
facts whose labels evaluate to \false."
Let Q be a subset of B. In the following, the valuation ! is assumed to be
such that it replaces the variables corresponding to elements of Q by \true"
and the others by \false." Obviously, this means that !(A [ B) = A [Q.
Now we shall show how application of a rule of the labelled consistency
algorithm to a labelled ABox A
0
corresponds to application of a rule of the
unlabelled algorithm to !(A
0
). To get this correspondence, the conditions
on applicability of the disjunction and the exists-restriction rules have to be
weakened for the unlabelled algorithm:
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The modied disjunction rule. Assume that (C t D)(a) is in A
0
, and
that A
0
does not contain C(a) and D(a). The ABox A
1
is obtained
from A
0
by adding C(a), and the ABox A
2
is obtained from A
0
by
adding D(a).
The modied exists-restriction rule. Assume that (9R:C)(a) is in A
0
.
One generates a new individual name b, and obtains A
1
from A
0
by
adding R(a; b) and C(b).
Since the modied exists-restriction rule can be applied innitely often to
the same fact (9R:C)(a) the modied set of rules need no longer terminate.
But it is easy to see that the rst two properties stated in Proposition 6.1
still hold. This will be sucient for our purposes.
Lemma 6.5 Let A
0
;A
1
be labelled ABoxes such that A
1
is obtained from A
0
by application of the conjunction (resp. exists-restriction, value-restriction)
rule. Then we either have !(A
1
) = !(A
0
), or !(A
1
) is obtained from
!(A
0
) by application of the (unlabelled) conjunction (resp. modied exists-
restriction, value-restriction) rule.
Proof. (1) Assume that the conjunction rule is applied to the assertional
fact (C uD)(a), and that this fact has index  in A
0
.
First, consider the case where !() = false. In this case, we have !(A
1
) =
!(A
0
). In fact, if C(a) (resp. D(a)) is not in A
0
then this fact has index  in
A
1
. Since !() = false this means that C(a) (resp. D(a)) is not in !(A
1
). If
C(a) (resp. D(a)) is an element of A
0
with index  then C(a) (resp. D(a))
has index  _  in A
1
. Since !() = false we have !( _ ) = !( ), which
shows that C(a) (resp. D(a)) is an element of !(A
1
) i it is an element of
!(A
0
).
Now assume that !() = true. Thus (C uD)(a) is an element of !(A
0
).
Since A
1
is obtained by extending A
0
by C(a) and D(a), both with index ,
we also know that C(a) and D(a) are contained in !(A
1
). If both facts are
already present in !(A
0
) we have !(A
1
) = !(A
0
). Otherwise, !(A
1
) can be
obtained from !(A
0
) by applying the conjunction rule to (C uD)(a).
(2) Assume that the value-restriction rule is applied to the assertional
facts (8R:C)(a) and R(a; b), and that these facts respectively have index 
1
and 
2
in A
0
.
As for the conjunction rule, !(
1
^ 
2
) = false implies !(A
1
) = !(A
0
).
Thus assume that !(
1
^ 
2
) = true. Then (8R:C)(a) and R(a; b) are con-
tained in !(A
0
). Since A
1
is obtained by extending A
0
by C(b) with index

1
^ 
2
, we know that C(b) is an element of !(A
1
). If this assertional fact
is already present in !(A
0
) then !(A
1
) = !(A
0
). Otherwise, !(A
1
) can be
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obtained from !(A
0
) by applying the value-restriction rule to (8R:C)(a) and
R(a; b).
(3) Assume that the exists-restriction rule is applied to the assertional
fact (9R:C)(a), and that this fact has index  in A
0
.
The case where !() = false is again trivial. Thus assume that !() =
true. Then (9R:C)(a) is an element of !(A
0
). The labelled ABox A
1
is
obtained from A
0
by generating a new individual b, and adding C(b) and
R(a; b) to A
0
, both with index . For this reason, C(b) and R(a; b) are con-
tained in !(A
1
). We can obtain !(A
1
) from !(A
0
) by applying the modied
exists-restriction rule to (9R:C)(a) (without loss of generality we may assume
that the newly generated individual is called b). It should be noted that the
(unmodied) exists-restriction rule need not be applicable since !(A
0
) may
well contain an individual c and assertions C(c) and R(a; c).
For the disjunction rule, we have a similar lemma.
Lemma 6.6 Let A
0
;A
1
;A
2
be labelled ABoxes such that A
1
;A
2
are obtained
from A
0
by application of the disjunction rule. Then we either have !(A
1
) =
!(A
0
) = !(A
2
), or !(A
1
); !(A
2
) are obtained from !(A
0
) by application of
the (unlabelled) modied disjunction rule.
Proof. Assume that the disjunction rule is applied to the assertional fact
(C tD)(a), and that this fact has index  in A
0
.
If !() = false then !(A
1
) = !(A
0
) = !(A
2
). This can be shown as in
the corresponding cases in the proof of Lemma 6.5.
Thus assume that !() = true. Then (C tD)(a) is an element of !(A
0
).
In addition, we know that C(a) is contained in !(A
1
) and that D(a) is
contained in !(A
2
). If both C(a) and D(a) are already present in !(A
0
)
then !(A
1
) = !(A
0
) = !(A
2
). Otherwise, we can obtain !(A
1
); !(A
2
) from
!(A
0
) by applying the modied disjunction rule to (C t D)(a). It should
be noted that the (unmodied) disjunction rule need not be applicable since
!(A
0
) may well contain one of C(a) and D(a), but not both.
Now assume that we have obtained the complete ABoxes A
1
; : : : ;A
n
by
starting with A[B, and applying the rules of the labelled consistency algo-
rithm as long as possible. By Lemma 6.5 and 6.6, and since the (modied)
rules of the unlabelled consistency algorithm preserve solvability, we know
that !(A[B) = A[Q is consistent i one of !(A
1
); : : : ; !(A
n
) is consistent.
The next lemma implies that these projected ABoxes are also complete.
Lemma 6.7 Let A
0
be a labelled ABox to which none of the rules of the
labelled consistency algorithm applies. Then none of the (unmodied) rules
of the unlabelled consistency algorithm applies to !(A
0
).
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Proof. We consider an assertional fact (C u D)(a) in !(A
0
), and show
that the conjunction rule cannot be applied to this fact in !(A
0
). (The other
cases can be treated similarly.)
Since (C u D)(a) is present in !(A
0
) its index  in A
0
satises !() =
true. Completeness of A
0
implies that the (labelled) conjunction rule is not
applicable to (C uD)(a) in A
0
. For this reason, A
0
contains the assertional
facts C(a) and D(a), and their indices (say  
1
;  
2
) are implied by . But
then !() = true implies !( 
1
) = true = !( 
2
). Thus C(a) and D(a) are
contained in !(A
0
), which shows that the conjunction rule is not applicable
to (C uD)(a) in !(A
0
).
Since A
1
; : : : ;A
n
are complete we thus know that !(A
1
); : : : ; !(A
n
) are
complete as well. Now Proposition 6.1 implies that !(A
i
) is inconsistent i
it contains a clash. A particular clash A(a);:A(a) 2 A
i
is still present in
!(A
i
) i ! evaluates ind(A(a))^ ind(:A(a)) to \true." Now let  
i;1
; : : : ;  
i;k
i
be the formulae expressing all the clashes in A
i
. Obviously, !(A
i
) contains
a clash i ! evaluates
W
k
i
j=1
 
i;j
to \true." For this reason, all the ABoxes
!(A
1
); : : : ; !(A
n
) contain a clash i ! evaluates to \true" the clash formula
n
^
i=1
k
i
_
j=1
 
i;j
computed by the labelled consistency algorithm. This concludes the proof of
Proposition 6.3.
Extension to ALCF
In the remaining part of this section we shall sketch how the above described
algorithm can be extended to handle the attributes and agreements ofALCF .
Attributes in exists- and value-restrictions are treated like roles. Applying
the exists-restriction rule to two assertional facts (9f:C)(a) and (9f:D)(a) in-
troduces two dierent individual names c; d with the assertional facts f(a; c),
f(a; d). If f is an attribute, this means that c and d have to be interpreted
as the same individual. This shows that we can no longer have a unique
name assumption for the individuals which are introduced by rules. For this
reason, we shall now distinguish between \old" individuals, i.e., individuals
present in the original ABox A [ B, and \new" individuals introduced by
rule applications. New individuals are not subjected to the unique name
assumption. In order to make the constraint that c; d have to be interpreted
by the same individual explicit, the consistency algorithm for ALCF (see
[11]) identies these two individual names, e.g., by replacing every occur-
rence of c by d. In the labelled consistency algorithm, instead of making
an actual replacement, we just introduce an equality fact c = d. Of course,
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this equality has to be equipped with an index, in the same way as other
facts are. Here the fact c = d gets index ind(f(a; c)) ^ ind(f(a; d)) if it is
newly introduced, otherwise one takes the disjunction of its old index with
ind(f(a; c)) ^ ind(f(a; d)). In case ind(f(a; c)) ^ ind(f(a; d)) implies the old
index, nothing has to be changed.
With the help of the equality facts, it is easy to formulate an agreement
rule. In principle, the agreement rule applied to (f
1
   f
m
:
= g
1
   g
n
)(a) in-
troduces the assertional facts f
1
(a; c
1
), ..., f
m
(c
m 1
; c
m
), g
1
(a; d
1
), ..., g
n
(d
n 1
;
d
n
) and c
m
= d
n
, where c
1
, ..., d
n
are new individual names. Applicability of
this rule, and the indices of the new facts (or new indices of existing facts)
are dened analogously to the other rules.
The equality facts dene an equivalence relation on individual names,
which has to be taken into account when ring rules or looking for clashes.
Premises of rules have to be read modulo this equivalence. For example, this
means that the value-restriction rule may be applicable to the facts (8R:C)(a)
and R(a
0
; b), if there are equalities a = a
0
; a
1
= a
2
; : : : ; a
n
= a
0
in the ABox.
Of course, the indices of these equalities have to contribute to the new index
of C(b) as well. On the other hand, this rule need not be applied if there
exists an assertional fact C(b
0
) and equalities b = b
0
; b
1
= b
2
; : : : ; b
m
= b
0
such
that ind((8R:C)(a)) ^ ind(R(a
0
; b)) ^ ind(a = a
0
) : : : ^ ind(a
n
= a
0
) implies
ind(C(b
0
)) ^ ind(b = b
0
) : : : ^ ind(b
m
= b
0
).
Similarly, there is a clash if A(a) and :A(a
0
) is in the ABox, along with
equalities a = a
0
; a
1
= a
2
; : : : ; a
n
= a
0
. Because we still have unique name
assumption for the old individuals, the equalities may cause another kind of
obvious contradiction. We have a clash if a; a
0
are old individuals and there
are equalities a = a
0
; a
1
= a
2
; : : : ; a
n
= a
0
in the ABox. The index associated
with this clash is ind(a = a
0
) ^ : : : ^ ind(a
n
= a
0
).
To sum up, we thus have a solution of the two algorithmic problems
described at the beginning of this section. Together with the methods of
Section 5 this give us eective procedures to compute all extensions of ter-
minological default theories.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated the integration of Reiter's default logic into a termi-
nological representation formalism, and have shown that the treatment of
open defaults by Skolemization is problematic, both from a semantic and an
algorithmic point of view. For this reason, we have considered a restricted se-
mantics where default rules are only applied to individuals explicitly present
in the knowledge base. This treatment of default rules is similar to the treat-
ment of monotonic rules in many terminological systems, which means that
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users of such systems are already familiar with the eects this restriction to
explicit individuals has. However, because of the nonmonotonic character of
default rules, this restriction may sometimes lead to more consequences than
would have been obtained without it.
With respect to the restricted semantics, the methods of Junker and
Konolige and of Schwind and Risch for computing all extensions of a default
theory can be applied. We have shown how the algorithmic requirements
for Junker and Konolige's method (i.e., the computation of minimal incon-
sistent sets of assertional facts) and for an optimized algorithm based on a
theorem of Schwind and Risch (i.e., the computation of maximal consistent
sets of assertional facts) can be solved by an extension of the tableaux-based
algorithm for assertional reasoning.
As an alternative to the pragmatic solution described in the present pa-
per, [4] proposes a new semantics for open defaults, in which defaults are
also applied to implicit individuals. To make this possible without encoun-
tering the problems pointed out in Section 3, open defaults are not viewed
as schemata for certain instantiated defaults. Instead, they are used to de-
ne a preference relation on models, which is then treated with a modied
preferential approach.
According to Reiter's semantics the specicity of prerequisites of rules
has no inuence on the order in which defaults rules are supposed to re. In
[3] we describe a modication of terminological default logic in which more
specic defaults are preferred.
Acknowledgements
We should like to thank Bernhard Nebel and Peter Patel-Schneider for helpful
comments.
This work has been supported by the German Ministry for Research and
Technology (BMFT) under research contract ITW 8903 0.
References
[1] F. Baader and P. Hanschke. A Scheme for Integrating Concrete Domains
into Concept Languages. Research Report RR-91-10, DFKI Kaisers-
lautern, 1991.
[2] F. Baader and P. Hanschke. A scheme for integrating concrete domains
into concept languages. In Proceedings of the 12th International Joint
Conference on Articial Intelligence, Sydney, Australia, 1991.
31
[3] F. Baader and B. Hollunder. How to prefer more specic defaults in
terminological default logic. Research Report RR-92-58, DFKI Saar-
brucken, 1992.
[4] F. Baader and K. Schlechta. A semantics for open normal defaults via
a modied preferential approach. Research Report RR-93-13, DFKI
Saarbrucken, 1993.
[5] R. J. Brachman. `I lied about the trees' or, defaults and denitions in
knowledge representation. The AI Magazine, 6(3):80{93, 1985.
[6] R. J. Brachman, D. L. McGuinness, P. F. Patel-Schneider, L. A. Resnick,
and A. Borgida. Living with CLASSIC: When and how to use a KL-
ONE-like language. In J. Sowa, editor, Principles of Semantic Networks,
pages 401{456. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, Calif., 1991.
[7] R. J. Brachman and J. G. Schmolze. An overview of the KL-ONE
knowledge representation system. Cognitive Science, 9(2):171{216, 1985.
[8] J. Doyle. A truth maintenance system. Articial Intelligence, 12:231{
272, 1979.
[9] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability { A Guide to
the Theory of NP-Completeness. Freeman, San Francisco, Cal., 1979.
[10] B. Hollunder. Hybrid inferences in KL-ONE-based knowledge represen-
tation systems. In 14th German Workshop on Articial Intelligence,
volume 251 of Informatik-Fachberichte, pages 38{47, Ebingerfeld, Ger-
many, 1990. Springer.
[11] B. Hollunder and W. Nutt. Subsumption Algorithms for Concept Lan-
guages. Research Report RR-90-04, DFKI Kaiserslautern, 1990.
[12] U. Junker and K. Konolige. Computing extensions of autoepistemic and
default logics with a truth maintenance system. In Proceedings of the 8th
National Conference on Articial Intelligence, pages 278{283, Boston,
Mass., 1990.
[13] H. A. Kautz and B. Selman. Hard problems for simple default log-
ics. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Principles
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 189{197, Toronto,
Ont., 1989.
[14] A. Kobsa. The SB-ONE knowledge representation workbench. In
Preprints of the Workshop on Formal Aspects of Semantic Networks,
Two Habours, Calif., 1989.
32
[15] V. Lifschitz. On open defaults. In Proceedings of the Symposium on
Computational Logics, Brussel, Belgium, 1990.
[16] E. Mays and B. Dionne. Making KR systems useful. In Terminological
Logic Users Workshop { Proceedings, pages 11{12, KIT-Report 95, TU
Berlin, 1991.
[17] J. McCarthy. Circumscription { a form of non-monotonic reasoning.
Articial Intelligence, 13:27{39, 1980.
[18] D. McDermott and J. Doyle. Non-monotonic logic I. Articial Intelli-
gence, 13:41{72, 1980.
[19] R. McGregor. Statement of interest. In B. Nebel, C. Peltason, and
K. von Luck, editors, Statement of Interest for the 2nd International
Workshop on Terminological Logics. Document D-91-13, DFKI Kaiser-
slautern, 1991.
[20] BACK. System presentation. In Terminological Logic Users Workshop
{ Proceedings, page 186, KIT-Report 95, TU Berlin, 1991.
[21] B. Nebel and G. Smolka. Attributive description formalisms : : : and the
rest of the world. In C. Rollinger O. Herzog, editor, Text Understanding
in LILOG, LNAI 546. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 1991.
[22] C. Peltason, K. v. Luck, and C. Kindermann (Org.). Terminological
logic users workshop { Proceedings. KIT Report 95, TU Berlin, 1991.
[23] D. L. Poole. Variables in hypothesis. In Proceedings of the 10th Inter-
national Joint Conference on Articial Intelligence, Milano, Italy, 1987.
[24] E. L. Post. Recursive unsolvability of a problem of Thue. Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 12:1{10, 1947.
[25] R. Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Articial Intelligence, 13(1-
2):81{132, 1980.
[26] R. Reiter. A theory of diagnosis from rst principles. Articial Intelli-
gence, 32:57{95, 1987.
[27] R. Rymon. Search through systematic set enumeration. In Proceedings
of the 3rd International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Repre-
sentation and Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass., 1992.
33
[28] C. Schwind and V. Risch. A tableau-based characterisation for de-
fault logic. In Proceedings of the 1st European Conference on Symbolic
and Quantitative Approaches for Uncertainty, pages 310{317, Marseille,
France, 1991.
34
